Friday, August 7, 2026

The Most Expensive Tax May Be the One That Never Appears in the Budget


Economic debates usually focus on taxes that can be counted. Corporate tax has a rate. GST has a rate. Customs duties have a rate. Interest has a rate. But there is another cost imposed on businesses that appears in no tax notification and is collected by no government department. It is the cost of not knowing what comes next.

Uncertainty behaves like an invisible tax.

A business that does not know when its customer will pay, whether demand will remain strong, how an authority will interpret a regulation, what an imported input will cost three months later, whether a trade restriction will suddenly change, or how long an approval will take begins to behave differently. It delays investment. It keeps more cash. It hires cautiously. It avoids debt. It reduces inventory. It refuses large orders that require substantial working capital. Sometimes it deliberately remains small.

This is where uncertainty stops being merely a business problem and becomes an economic development problem.

From Licence Raj to the Age of Unpredictability

India has travelled a remarkable distance from the controlled economy that existed before the reforms of 1991. Industrial licensing was reduced, trade barriers came down, private investment expanded, foreign capital entered, financial markets deepened and India became increasingly connected with global production and technology.

But economic reform has an unfinished dimension.

The old problem was often the difficulty of obtaining permission. The new problem can be the difficulty of predicting outcomes.

A company may formally be free to invest, yet hesitate because it cannot confidently estimate future demand, payment cycles, compliance requirements, logistics costs or global market access. Economic freedom therefore requires more than removing restrictions. It requires reasonable predictability.

This distinction becomes particularly important for MSMEs.

A large corporation can maintain legal departments, compliance teams, treasury operations, multiple suppliers and substantial cash reserves. A small manufacturer may have the owner performing several of these functions personally. The same uncertainty therefore does not impose the same cost on every enterprise.

The invisible tax is highly regressive.

A ₹1 Crore Order Can Become a Liability

Imagine a small engineering company receiving a large order. On paper, this is good news.

The company must purchase raw materials, pay wages, finance electricity, arrange transport and possibly borrow working capital before receiving payment. If payment arrives within the agreed period, the order generates profit.

But suppose payment is delayed for several months.

The company still pays interest. Workers still expect salaries. Suppliers still demand payment. Banks still expect instalments. GST and other obligations operate according to their own timelines.

Suddenly, growth creates a liquidity problem.

This produces one of the strangest outcomes in business economics: a rational entrepreneur may refuse additional business because the financial risk of growth is greater than the expected return from growth.

The economy sees an MSME unwilling to expand. The entrepreneur sees a balance sheet that may not survive another delayed payment.

That difference matters.

India Has Many Entrepreneurs but Too Much Defensive Entrepreneurship

Indian businesses have become exceptionally skilled at surviving uncertainty. But survival capability should not be confused with productivity.

Many enterprises maintain multiple suppliers because they fear disruption. They keep extra inventory because delivery schedules are uncertain. They rely heavily on informal relationships because contractual enforcement can be slow. They avoid ambitious expansion because future demand is difficult to estimate. They retain cash because the next shock is unknown.

Each decision may be individually sensible.

Collectively, however, they create an economy operating below its productive potential.

Money sitting defensively in a bank account does not buy machinery. A factory postponing expansion does not create new jobs. An entrepreneur avoiding formal borrowing does not build productive capacity. A company unwilling to enter a new market does not become an exporter.

Uncertainty therefore does not simply reduce confidence. It changes capital allocation.

The Tax Has Many Collectors

The unusual feature of the uncertainty tax is that no single institution imposes it.

Part of it comes from government processes. Part comes from delayed commercial payments. Part comes from volatile commodity prices. Part comes from financial institutions. Part comes from infrastructure failures. Part comes from global trade disruptions. And increasingly, part comes from geopolitics.

A manufacturer today may have to think simultaneously about exchange rates, shipping routes, tariffs, energy prices, technology changes, environmental standards, carbon requirements, artificial intelligence, supply-chain concentration and geopolitical tensions.

The world has moved from an era in which efficiency was built around predictable globalisation towards an era in which resilience is being built around unpredictable fragmentation.

For India, this creates both danger and opportunity.

Companies around the world are reconsidering where they manufacture and source. India can benefit from diversification away from excessively concentrated global supply chains. But investors searching for alternatives are not comparing India only on wages or market size. They are increasingly comparing countries on reliability.

The competitive question of the future may therefore be surprisingly simple:

How predictable is it to do business here?

Why Small Firms Pay More

The invisible tax of uncertainty is particularly damaging because its effective rate falls as businesses become larger.

A corporation with operations across several states can absorb a disruption in one location. A small enterprise cannot. A multinational can hedge currency exposure. A small exporter often cannot. A large buyer can negotiate longer credit periods. A small supplier frequently accepts them. A large company can survive a delayed receivable. For a micro enterprise, the same delay can threaten salaries and loan repayments.

This creates a hidden mechanism of market concentration.

Repeated uncertainty can gradually transfer economic power towards organisations with the strongest balance sheets.

Every crisis accelerates the process. The financially strong survive, purchase distressed assets, gain market share and negotiate better terms. Smaller enterprises exhaust working capital, reduce employment or disappear.

The invisible tax can therefore eventually become a tax on competition itself.

The Dangerous Economics of Staying Small

Economic policy usually assumes that entrepreneurs want to grow.

That assumption deserves examination.

Growth means more workers, more machinery, larger loans, more customers, larger inventories and longer supply chains. Every additional commitment increases exposure to uncertainty.

If the institutional environment does not reduce that uncertainty, remaining small may become economically rational.

This creates a development trap.

India can produce millions of enterprises without producing enough medium-sized companies capable of competing internationally. The missing middle of enterprise development is therefore not merely a finance problem or a technology problem. It is partly a confidence problem created by uncertainty around the consequences of expansion.

An entrepreneur who has spent twenty years surviving may value control more than scale.

That is not necessarily lack of ambition. It can be accumulated economic memory.

Artificial Intelligence Will Reduce Some Uncertainty and Create New Forms of It

The next decade will make this issue more complicated.

Artificial intelligence, predictive analytics, digital payments, GST data, account aggregators, satellite information, digital supply chains and real-time logistics systems can dramatically improve business forecasting. Banks may assess credit risk faster. Manufacturers may predict demand more accurately. Governments may identify bottlenecks earlier. Supply chains may become increasingly visible.

Technology could therefore reduce part of the uncertainty tax.

But it will create another layer.

Businesses will face uncertainty about which technologies will survive, which occupations will disappear, which skills will remain valuable, how AI will be regulated, who owns commercially valuable data and whether investments made today will become obsolete within a few years.

Technology may make tomorrow more measurable while simultaneously making the day after tomorrow less predictable.

This is why the traditional five-year business plan may gradually lose relevance. Companies will increasingly need flexible investment models, shorter decision cycles, diversified supply chains and continuous scenario planning.

Predictability Should Become Economic Infrastructure

India spends enormous resources building physical infrastructure. Roads reduce transport costs. Ports reduce logistics costs. Electricity infrastructure reduces production costs. Digital infrastructure reduces transaction costs.

Predictability should be understood in the same way.

A predictable approval system is economic infrastructure.

A reliable commercial payment system is economic infrastructure.

Consistent regulatory interpretation is economic infrastructure.

Stable and clearly communicated trade policy is economic infrastructure.

Fast contract enforcement is economic infrastructure.

Accessible information about future regulations is economic infrastructure.

These systems may not produce photographs of newly inaugurated assets, but they can generate enormous economic value.

This requires a shift in how governments measure ease of doing business. The important question should not simply be how many approvals have been digitised or how many regulations have been removed.

The deeper question is how much uncertainty has actually been removed from an entrepreneur’s decision.

India Needs an Uncertainty Reduction Policy

The next generation of economic reform should move beyond deregulation towards predictability.

Government departments could publish regulatory calendars indicating important proposed changes well in advance. Major rules affecting investment could include reasonable transition periods. Approval systems could provide legally meaningful timelines rather than merely digital application numbers. Delayed payments could be tracked as a systemic financial risk rather than treated only as disputes between individual firms.

Banks could increasingly evaluate MSME cash flows instead of depending excessively on collateral. Government procurement systems could automatically identify payment delays. Export policy could place greater weight on stability because international customers build supply chains over years, not weeks.

Industrial clusters could also become uncertainty-reduction institutions.

A strong cluster organisation can provide shared market intelligence, regulatory interpretation, technology forecasting, export information, common testing, pooled procurement and early warning about supply-chain disruptions. Instead of every small entrepreneur separately trying to understand an increasingly complex world, institutions can distribute the cost of knowledge across hundreds of firms.

This may become one of the most important roles of industry associations in the future.

The Real Ease of Doing Business Is the Ability to See Tomorrow

For decades, development policy has concentrated on reducing visible costs: taxes, tariffs, interest rates, logistics expenses and compliance burdens.

The next frontier is reducing invisible costs.

An economy becomes investment-friendly not merely when starting a business is easy, but when an entrepreneur can make a five-year commitment without constantly fearing that the assumptions behind the investment will suddenly collapse.

This does not mean eliminating risk. No government can guarantee demand, commodity prices, technology or geopolitics.

The objective should be to separate unavoidable market risk from avoidable institutional uncertainty.

That distinction is fundamental.

Entrepreneurs are supposed to take commercial risks. They should not have to gamble on administrative unpredictability.

India’s ambition to become a major manufacturing, exporting and innovation economy will therefore depend on something that rarely appears in industrial policy documents: confidence in the future.

Capital ultimately moves towards opportunity, but long-term capital stays where opportunity is accompanied by reasonable predictability.

The most powerful reform of the coming decade may consequently be neither another subsidy nor another scheme.

It may simply be making tomorrow easier to trust.

#MSME #IndianEconomy #Entrepreneurship #Manufacturing #Business #EconomicReforms #IndustrialClusters #Investment #India


Thursday, August 6, 2026

Handmade India: Growth, Government Support and the Marketing Strategy That Is Still Missing

India does not have one clearly defined statistical category called handmade products. The sector is spread across handicrafts, handlooms, carpets, village industries, tribal products, products made by self-help groups, handmade jewellery, natural-fibre goods, artisanal food products and craft-based fashion. Therefore, any single market-size estimate should be treated cautiously.

The most reliable comparable indicator is handicraft exports. Exports of handicrafts excluding hand-knotted carpets increased from ₹20,082.53 crore in 2014–15 to ₹33,122.79 crore in 2024–25. This represents cumulative growth of about 65 per cent and an annual compound growth rate of approximately 5.1 per cent in rupee terms. In FY2024–25, handicraft exports were valued at roughly US$3.89 billion. 

This is growth, but not yet transformation.

A sector employing millions of people, carrying centuries of cultural knowledge and supplying products to global home, lifestyle, fashion and gift markets should arguably have expanded much faster. Once inflation, exchange-rate movements and rising material costs are considered, the real increase in artisan production and income may be much smaller than the export figures suggest.

The growth paradox

India possesses almost every ingredient needed to become the world’s leading handmade economy: an enormous diversity of skills, low-volume production capability, cultural authenticity, natural materials, regional identities, a large artisan base and an expanding global interest in sustainable and traceable products.

Yet India continues to sell a significant share of its handmade products as anonymous merchandise.

The object may be made in India, but the customer relationship, design ownership, brand value, retail margin and market information are frequently controlled elsewhere. An artisan may receive the smallest part of the final price even though craftsmanship is the product’s central source of value.

This is the basic contradiction of the sector. India is rich in making but weak in market ownership.

Growth has also been uneven. Export-ready manufacturers and organised craft enterprises can participate in fairs, meet buyers, manage compliance and supply large orders. Individual artisans and small producer groups frequently struggle with product photography, packaging, price calculation, barcoding, cataloguing, digital advertising, customer service, working capital and timely delivery.

The market is expanding, but access to that market remains highly unequal.

What marketing facilities does the government provide?

Government assistance is not insignificant. It operates through several ministries, programmes and institutions.

Under the Ministry of Textiles, support includes domestic marketing events, Gandhi Shilp Bazars, exhibitions, fashion shows, buyer-seller meetings, reverse buyer-seller meetings, international fairs, craft exposure programmes and virtual marketing events. EPCH organises major trade platforms, including the India Handicrafts and Gifts Fair, and provides export information, market studies and international promotion support. 

Handloom and artisan entities are also being connected with Government e-Marketplace. As of July 2026, the government reported that 6,865 weavers or handloom entities had been onboarded on GeM, while 143 marketing events had been organised and several Urban Haats were operating in Uttar Pradesh. 

Under the National Rural Livelihoods Mission, products made by women’s self-help groups are promoted through SARAS Aajeevika Melas, the SARAS Collection on GeM, the eSARAS platform and partnerships with Amazon, Flipkart, Meesho and JioMart. eSARAS has also been connected with ONDC. 

Other support mechanisms include Geographical Indication registration, India Handloom Brand, Handicrafts Mark, design development, artisan identity cards, cluster development, training, toolkits, credit support, packaging assistance and schemes such as PM Vishwakarma.

These facilities create visibility and some transaction opportunities. However, visibility should not be confused with a complete marketing system.

The Kunj: important infrastructure, but not yet a national strategy

The Kunj was inaugurated in New Delhi on 21 August 2025. It was developed by the Office of the Development Commissioner Handicrafts as a flagship retail and cultural destination for Indian handicrafts and handlooms. Its concept combines curated retail, exhibitions, demonstrations, workshops, cultural activity and contemporary presentation. 

The Kunj is strategically important because it tries to change the visual language of Indian craft. Instead of presenting handmade products only in temporary stalls or crowded fairs, it places them in an organised, design-led and premium environment.

That change is necessary. Presentation influences price perception. A product displayed as a souvenir receives one price. The same product, documented, curated and presented as collectible design may receive a completely different price.

But a critical distinction must be made: The Kunj is a marketing asset; it is not yet a marketing architecture.

A flagship centre in Delhi can serve tourists, diplomats, designers, urban consumers and institutional buyers. It cannot by itself solve the market problems of artisans in Kutch, Kinnaur, Bhagalpur, Kutch, Kashmir, Odisha, the Northeast, Tamil Nadu or central India.

Its success should therefore not be assessed primarily by visitor numbers, inaugurations or the beauty of the premises. It should be evaluated through measurable economic outcomes:

  • value of annual sales;
  • number of repeat customers;
  • export orders generated;
  • proportion of the retail price reaching producers;
  • number of artisans graduating into independent brands;
  • average order size;
  • repeat purchase rate;
  • product rejection rate;
  • women artisans’ income growth;
  • number of institutional and international buyers acquired.

Without these indicators, The Kunj risks becoming an elegant showroom surrounded by an unchanged production system.

The weakness of the existing government approach

Much of the current system is organised around events. Artisans are taken to a fair, given a stall, exposed to customers and then expected to manage the rest.

This event-centred model produces episodic sales rather than permanent market access.

A fair may generate revenue for ten days. An effective marketing system must generate orders for twelve months. It must collect customer data, maintain inventories, analyse which products are selling, arrange repeat production, manage logistics, settle payments and help producers improve future collections.

The second weakness is that assistance is often scheme-led rather than market-led. Government agencies may count the number of artisans trained, exhibitions organised, stalls allocated or products uploaded. The market, however, asks different questions: Was the product relevant? Was the quality consistent? Was it delivered on time? Did the customer reorder? Was the price competitive? Could production be scaled without destroying authenticity?

The third problem is platform fragmentation. An artisan may be listed on GeM, ONDC, eSARAS or a private marketplace but receive few orders. Digital onboarding is only the opening of a door. It does not guarantee that buyers will enter.

Successful e-commerce requires search optimisation, professional images, reviews, advertising, fulfilment, returns management, multilingual customer support and continuous catalogue renewal. Most artisan groups cannot manage these functions individually.

The fourth problem is the absence of demand intelligence. Production is frequently based on inherited designs, government training modules or what sold in the previous exhibition. There is limited real-time information on changing colours, sizes, home-interior trends, gifting seasons, sustainability claims, overseas regulations or consumer price bands.

India continues to produce first and search for the customer later. Modern marketing begins with the customer and works backward towards design and production.

A precise long-term marketing strategy for handmade products

India requires a ten-year Handmade India Market Development Mission. It should not be another subsidy programme. It should be a commercially managed market-building system connecting artisans, designers, exporters, retailers, hotels, architects, e-commerce platforms and overseas distributors.

Phase One: 2026–2028 — Build the market foundation

The first task should be to create a reliable national database of craft enterprises, not merely artisans. It should record productive capacity, skills, materials, monthly output, quality level, certifications, digital readiness, current buyers and potential markets.

Products must then be divided into clear commercial segments:

  1. Affordable everyday handmade products
  2. Contemporary home and lifestyle products
  3. Corporate and institutional gifts
  4. Sustainable fashion and accessories
  5. Premium heritage products
  6. Collectible art and luxury craft
  7. Tourism and destination merchandise
  8. Architectural and hospitality applications

One product should not be pushed simultaneously into every market. A ₹500 basket, a ₹5,000 lamp and a ₹2 lakh art object need completely different buyers, channels, packaging and narratives.

During this phase, common market-service centres should be established in major craft clusters. These centres should provide photography, digital cataloguing, packaging, labelling, barcode generation, export documentation, quality testing and order management on a paid but subsidised basis.

Government funding should shift from paying mainly for stalls to paying for market readiness.

Phase Two: 2028–2031 — Move from exhibitions to permanent channels

The Kunj should become the headquarters of a wider network rather than remain an isolated destination.

A hub-and-spoke structure could connect it with regional craft centres in Jaipur, Varanasi, Srinagar, Ahmedabad, Bhubaneswar, Guwahati, Bengaluru, Chennai, Hyderabad, Lucknow and other major production regions.

Each regional hub should act as:

  • a permanent showroom;
  • a sampling and buyer centre;
  • a design laboratory;
  • an order-consolidation facility;
  • an export help desk;
  • a content-production studio;
  • a warehouse for fast-moving products.

India should also create shop-in-shop arrangements in airports, premium hotels, museums, railway stations, convention centres and major Indian diplomatic missions abroad. These should operate under uniform quality and merchandising standards rather than as unrelated souvenir counters.

Public procurement should become an anchor market. Government departments, public enterprises, universities and diplomatic missions spend heavily on gifts, furnishings, conference materials and interiors. A defined proportion could be sourced from verified handmade enterprises, provided quality, pricing and delivery standards are met.

Phase Three: 2031–2036 — Build global Indian craft brands

India should stop expecting every artisan to become an exporter. That is neither practical nor economically efficient.

The better model is to develop professionally managed producer enterprises and market intermediaries that remain accountable to artisans. These organisations should aggregate production, handle design, maintain quality and negotiate with retailers while ensuring transparent producer payments.

Export strategy should be market-specific.

For the United States, the focus could be home décor, ethical lifestyle products, festive merchandise and designer collaborations.

For Europe, greater emphasis should be placed on traceability, natural materials, circularity, product safety and low-carbon production.

For Japan, the strategy should emphasise precision, minimal design, natural textures, small-batch quality and excellent packaging.

For the Gulf region, opportunities exist in luxury gifting, hospitality interiors, wedding markets and customised décor.

For Africa and Southeast Asia, affordable handmade lifestyle products, institutional furnishing and craft-to-craft collaborations may be more relevant than luxury positioning.

Market diversification is important because excessive dependence on a few traditional destinations leaves artisans vulnerable to recessions, freight shocks, tariffs and changing consumer preferences.

The Kunj should become a market laboratory

The Kunj can play a far larger role than retailing finished products.

Every sale should generate data. The system should record who purchased, what price was accepted, which colours and materials moved fastest, which products were handled but not purchased, and which items produced repeat orders.

This information should flow back to designers and producers.

The Kunj should also operate seasonal product laboratories. Every six months, selected artisans, designers, architects, retailers and international buyers could jointly develop collections for specific markets such as hotel interiors, sustainable gifting, modern apartments, children’s products or premium fashion accessories.

A buyer-in-residence programme could invite international retailers and designers to spend time in Indian clusters. A craft incubator could help selected producer groups build independent brands. An export gallery could display market-compliant collections with prices, capacities, lead times and certification information.

In this form, The Kunj would become an institution for demand discovery, not simply a building for product display.

Digital strategy: one backend, many storefronts

India does not necessarily need another standalone craft website. It needs a shared digital commerce infrastructure.

A common backend should allow products to be sold simultaneously through The Kunj, ONDC, GeM, eSARAS, private marketplaces, museum stores and international retailers. Inventory, product descriptions, artisan information, pricing and orders should be synchronised.

Each product should carry a digital passport accessible through a QR code. It could show:

  • maker or producer group;
  • geographical origin;
  • material composition;
  • process used;
  • approximate production time;
  • care instructions;
  • authenticity certification;
  • environmental attributes;
  • producer payment principles.

However, storytelling must remain credible. The sector should avoid turning poverty into a marketing device. Customers should buy Indian handmade products because they are useful, beautiful, durable and culturally meaningful, not because they feel temporary sympathy for the producer.

Product development must precede promotion

A major part of what is described as a marketing problem is actually a product problem.

Some handmade products are visually attractive but too fragile for shipping. Some have inconsistent dimensions. Some use colours unsuitable for target markets. Some lack care instructions. Some packaging costs more than the item. Others cannot be replenished in commercially viable quantities.

Before promotion, every product should pass four tests:

Market relevance: Does a defined customer need it?

Commercial viability: Can it generate an adequate producer margin after packaging, logistics and commissions?

Reproducibility: Can quality be maintained across repeat orders?

Cultural integrity: Can adaptation occur without erasing the identity and knowledge of the craft?

Design intervention must not reduce all Indian crafts to the same urban minimalist appearance. Modernisation should expand the language of a craft, not remove its regional character.

Pricing and artisan income

India cannot build a serious handmade economy by keeping prices artificially low.

Cheap craft often means unpaid family labour, underpriced skills, poor material quality and no provision for product development. Yet simply increasing the retail price does not guarantee that artisans receive more.

Every supported marketing channel should disclose a transparent value chain: producer payment, aggregation cost, logistics, marketing expense, retailer margin and taxes. This would allow government programmes to track whether market expansion is actually improving artisan incomes.

The central performance indicator should be net income per working day of the artisan, not only total sales generated by the scheme.

The government’s stated ambition to raise women artisans’ monthly incomes to ₹15,000–20,000 is meaningful, but it will require regular orders, higher productivity and stronger producer bargaining power—not occasional exhibitions alone. 

Market outreach targets

A serious national mission should establish measurable targets for 2030 and 2035.

By 2030, India could reasonably aim to:

  • double handicraft exports from the 2024–25 base;
  • ensure that at least half of supported artisan enterprises receive repeat orders;
  • create 100 professionally managed cluster brands;
  • connect major craft clusters with common fulfilment and market-service centres;
  • achieve substantial procurement from hotels, institutions and government buyers;
  • build reliable sales data across physical and digital channels.

By 2035, the goal should move beyond export turnover. India should seek global leadership in sustainable handmade lifestyle products, with Indian-owned brands controlling a greater share of design, distribution and retail value.

The final critical perspective

The future of Indian handmade products will not be secured merely by preserving old techniques. It will be secured by making those techniques economically relevant to new generations.

India has spent decades supporting production, training artisans and organising fairs. The next stage must be about controlling markets, data, brands, distribution and customer relationships.

The Kunj is a welcome beginning because it gives handmade products dignity, space and contemporary presentation. But its real value will emerge only when it becomes the visible front end of a much larger invisible system: market intelligence, cluster-level services, digital infrastructure, product development, transparent pricing, institutional procurement and global distribution.

India does not suffer from a shortage of crafts. It suffers from a shortage of organised pathways between craftsmanship and purchasing power.

The national strategy should therefore move:

from stalls to channels,
from schemes to enterprises,
from stories to verified value,
from isolated artisans to market-linked producer systems,
and from Made in India to Designed, Branded and Valued by India.

That is how handmade products can move from cultural survival to sustained economic growth.


#HandmadeIndia
#IndianHandicrafts
#HandloomIndia
#ArtisanEconomy
#CraftEconomy
#CreativeEconomy
#RuralEconomy
#MSME
#LocalToGlobal
#MadeInIndia
#VocalForLocal
#ExportGrowth
#MarketAccess
#BrandIndia
#SustainableBusiness
#CircularEconomy
#CulturalEconomy
#EconomicDevelopment
#InclusiveGrowth
#WomenEntrepreneurs
#DigitalCommerce
#ONDC
#ClusterDevelopment
#ValueChain
#FutureOfWork


The Most Expensive Tax May Be the One That Never Appears in the Budget

Economic debates usually focus on taxes that can be counted. Corporate tax has a rate. GST has a rate. Customs duties have a rate. Interest...